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Has the International Olympic Committee
Risen Above Corruption?
BRIGIDA BENITEZ & JOHN LONDON†

INTRODUCTION
International sports provide a fertile ground for corruption –
billions of dollars in revenues at stake, competition among cities for
hosting privileges that can result in substantial proceeds and
resources, a lack of transparency in decision-making, and public
officials in the midst of it all. Rising above corruption can seem like
a formidable feat.
The investigations and resulting criminal proceedings and
litigation related to alleged corruption perpetrated by executives at
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”)
highlight the risk of corruption in international sports. In May 2015,
the United States indicted fourteen former FIFA officials with a
variety of charges, including racketeering, money laundering, and
wire fraud.1 After the indictment, an independent investigation
conducted by FIFA’s counsel revealed a coordinated effort by three
former top officials to corruptly enrich themselves with over 79
million Swiss francs in the last five years using excessive salaries,
World Cup bonuses, and other incentives.2
© 2017 Brigida Benitez and John London.
†
Brigida Benitez is a partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP in Washington, DC, where
she focuses on global anti-corruption matters, internal investigations and complex business
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1. Office of Pub. Aff., Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for
Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, DEPT. OF JUST. (May 27, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indictedracketeering-conspiracy-and.
2. FIFA, Attorneys for FIFA Provide Update on Internal Investigation and Details on
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More recently, in November 2016, the former governor of Rio
de Janeiro, was arrested on corruption charges for allegedly taking
bribes in connection with public construction projects, including the
renovation of the Maracanã Stadium before the 2014 FIFA World
Cup and 2016 Olympic Games.3
The opportunity for corruption within international sports
organizations is hardly surprising: the amount of money generated by
the largest sporting events can be staggering. The 2014 World Cup
in Brazil generated $4.8 billion in revenue for FIFA, with $2.2 billion
in expenses.4 In addition, revenue and brand recognition can create
bad incentives for corporate partners. For example, two sports
marketing companies associated with FIFA were convicted of
criminal wrongdoing and agreed to forfeit over $190 million,5 and
prosecutors reportedly are investigating subsidiaries of DirecTV and
Fox for allegedly bribing soccer officials to acquire broadcast rights
for soccer tournaments.6 Notably, however, FIFA is not the largest
international sporting organization, nor is the World Cup the most
recognizable recurring sporting event.
The International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) describes the
Olympic Games as the world’s biggest sporting event and the
Olympic rings as one of the most widely recognized symbols in the
world.7 Outlays to host the Olympic Games are enormous for the
host cities, and revenues are on par or higher than those collected by
FIFA.8 As noted in more detail below, the IOC has embarked on a
number of reforms to increase its commitment to good governance
Compensation
for
Former
Top
Officials,
FIFA.COM
(June
3,
2016),
http://www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2016/m=6/news=attorneys-for-fifa-provideupdate-on-internal-investigation-and-detail-2799851.html.
3. Vinod Sreeharsha, Sergio Cabral, Ex-Governor of Rio de Janeiro, Arrested on
Corruption
Charges,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
17,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/world/americas/sergio-cabral-rio-governorcorruption.html.
4. Tony Manfred, FIFA Made an Insane Amount of Money Off of Brazil’s $15 Billion
World Cup, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/fifa-brazilworld-cup-revenue-2015-3.
5. Office of Pub. Aff., Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted for Racketeering
Conspiracy
and
Corruption,
DEPT.
OF
JUST.
(Dec.
3,
2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeeringconspiracy-and-corruption.
6. See id.
7. Int’l Olympic Comm’n, 2015 Annual Report at 36 (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/IOCAnnual-Report/IOC-Annual%20Report-2015.pdf.
8. See id. at 128, 130 (noting that the 2013–2016 Olympiad produced $5.6 billion in
revenue and $1.374 billion was distributed to London for the 2012 Olympic Games).
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and ethics, but corruption allegations still swirl around bids for the
2016 and 2020 Summer Olympic Games.9 The IOC operates in an
industry that presents risks for corruption, routinely deals with public
officials, and often conducts its business in countries perceived to
have high levels of corruption. As such, the IOC is expected to
maintain an effective compliance program to prevent and detect
potential misconduct.
This Article examines the IOC’s rules and procedures to
determine their adequacy in addressing potential corruption. To that
end, we first explore the structure of the IOC and its history of
corruption scandals. The Article then focuses on the changes that the
IOC has made over the years to its policies and procedures in an
effort to address corruption risks. We then describe international
guidance for best practices in the design of a robust anti-corruption
compliance program. Finally, the Article examines potential gaps in
the IOC’s policies and procedures that leave it vulnerable to
corruption.
I.

THE INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE
A.

Structure and Governance of IOC

The IOC is a Swiss non-profit non-governmental organization
subject to suit by both member nations and individuals.10 It has been
sued by both. For example, Kuwait sued the IOC in Switzerland for
one billion dollars in damages due to the suspension of its national
Olympic teams,11 and U.S. Olympian Justin Reiter unsuccessfully
sued the IOC in Switzerland to overturn its decision to remove
Parallel Giant Slalom snowboarding racing from the Winter
Olympics.12
The IOC is the highest level of governance in international
9. See Hugo Lowell, France Launches Corruption Investigation into Bid Processes for
2016
&
2020
Olympics,
EURONEWS
(Feb.
3,
2016),
http://www.euronews.com/2016/03/02/ioc-says-no-evidence-of-corruption-in-olympicbidding-despite-new-french.
10. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 15 at 31 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
11. Kuwait Sues IOC for $1 Billion over Olympic Ban, REUTERS (June 23, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-olympics-kuwait-idUSKCN0Z91KI.
12. Jason Blevins, Steamboat Olympian Justin Reiter Abandoning Lawsuit Against
IOC,
DENV.
POST
(last
updated
Nov.
25,
2016),
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/24/steamboat-olympian-justin-reiter-lawsuit-ioc/.
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sports. The IOC sets policies with respect to the Olympic Games,
and two other groups of organizations are beneath it: National
Olympic Committees (“NOC”) and International Sports Federations
(“IF”). The NOCs are responsible for fielding Olympic teams from
each nation and determining which cities in their respective countries
may apply to organize the Olympic Games.13 The IFs are nongovernmental organizations recognized by the IOC as the governing
bodies for their respective sports.14 For example, FIFA is the IF
responsible for the development of international soccer.15 IFs
monitor and enforce the integrity of their respective sports, organize
separate international events and competitions, and manage their
events at the Olympic Games.16 The National Federations for
individual sports are affiliated with the IFs.17
The IOC is also responsible for working with the Organizing
Committees for the Olympic Games (“OCOG”), which is organized
and supervised by the NOC of the host country. The OCOG is
responsible for, among other things, building or updating facilities
and venues for all competitions, acquiring lodging and adequate
medical facilities for athletes, ensuring adequate transportation is
available for the Olympic Games, and organizing cultural events and
celebrations.18
The highest body of the IOC is the Session, which is the general
meeting of all IOC members.19 The Session meets once per year and
is the only body entitled to select the host city for the Olympic
Games.20 Decisions at the Session are made by majority vote, and
half of the IOC members are required to be in attendance for
13. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 27 at 60 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
14. International
Sports
Federations,
INT’L
OLYMPIC
COMM.,
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-governance-international-sports-federations (last visited Jan.
22, 2017).
15. FIFA, Who We Are, FIFA.COM, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-weare/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
16. International
Sports
Federations,
INT’L
OLYMPIC
COMM.,
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-governance-international-sports-federations (last visited Jan.
22, 2017).
17. Id.
18. Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games, INT’L OLYMPIC COMM.,
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-governance-organising-committees (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
19. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 18 at 42 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
20. Id.
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quorum.21 IOC members are selected by current members through
the Members Election Commission, previously the Nominations
Commission. 22 The number of Members is capped at 115.23 Of the
IOC members, fifteen are active athletes elected during the Olympic
Games, fifteen are reserved for executives or senior leaders from IFs,
and fifteen are reserved for executives or senior leaders from world
or continental associations of the NOCs.24 IOC members are elected
for a term of eight years with no limits on subsequent terms.25 If a
member is elected after 1999, then there is an age limit of seventy
years old.26
General governance of the IOC is managed by the Executive
Board, which consists of the President, four Vice Presidents, and ten
general members.27 The Executive Board is elected by secret ballot at
the Session to a four-year term.28 The Executive Board is responsible
for management of the IOC’s finances, publication of the Annual
Report, the internal rules and regulations of the IOC, decisions
regarding the reelection of existing IOC members, and appointment
of the IOC Director General.29
21. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 18.3 at 42–43 (effective Aug. 2,
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.45768612.1479793253.1487346201.
22. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 16.2.3 at 38 – 39 (effective Aug. 2,
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.45768612.1479793253.1487346201.
23. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 16.1.1 at 32 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.45768612.1479793253.1487346201.
24 2015 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 68–69.
25. Id. at 68
26. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rules 16.3.3.1; 16.2.6.1 at 34; 40 (effective
Aug.
2,
2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
27. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 19.1 at 45 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
28. See
IOC
Executive
Board,
Int’l
Olympic
Comm.,
https://www.olympic.org/executive-board (last visited Jan. 22, 2017); see also Int’l Olympic
Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 20.1 at 48 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175 (stating the President has an
eight-year term with a potential four-year extension).
29. See
IOC
Executive
Board,
Int’l
Olympic
Comm.,
https://www.olympic.org/executive-board; see also Int’l Olympic Committee, Olympic
Charter
Rule
19.3
at
45–46
(effective
Aug.
2,
2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
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The IOC Director General is responsible for the administration
of the IOC, under the authority of the President.30 The Director
General is based in Lausanne, Switzerland and conducts the day-today work of the IOC.31 The IOC had 521 full-time employees at the
end of 2015 and runs a number of programs in collaboration with the
United Nations meant to further develop international sport across
different cultures.32
B.

Revenues and Expenditures of the IOC

The IOC generates revenue by promoting and hosting the
Olympic Games. During each cycle, called an Olympiad, the
Olympic Games generate billions of dollars in revenue from a variety
of sources.33 For example, projected revenue from the 2013–2016
Olympiad was $5.6 billion.34 Broadcast rights for the Olympics
accounted for 74% of total revenue during that time, while Olympic
sponsorships generated an additional 18%.35 Olympic sponsorships
are distributed through The Olympic Partners (“TOP”) program,
which assigns sponsorships throughout the four-year period.36
During the 2013–2016 cycle, the TOP program raised over one
billion dollars.37
The IOC distributes 90% of the revenue from the Olympics to
its subsidiary organizations, including NOCs and IFs.38 The NOCs
and IFs received $520 million respectively after the 2012 Summer
Olympic Games in London.39 Moreover, a significant portion of the
revenues are provided to the OCOG to defray costs associated with
hosting the Olympic Games. For instance, the IOC distributed
$1.250 billion to Beijing for the 2008 Summer Olympics and $1.374
billion to London for the 2012 Summer Olympic Games.40 The
remaining ten percent of revenue is used to support IOC operations
and fund IOC programs for the development and promotion of

30. 2015 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 52.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 52, 97.
33. Id. at 126 – 129.
34. Id. at 128
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also The TOP Dogs of Olympic Sponsorship, ALL BUSINESS,
https://www.allbusiness.com/the-top-dogs-of-olympic-sponsorship-13903444-1.html.
37. 2015 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 128.
38. Id. at129–31.
39. Id. at 130–31.
40. Id. at 130.
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international sport, which are administered by the Director General.41
The cost of hosting the Olympic Games has risen dramatically in
recent years, with Brazil estimated to have spent as much as $4.6
billion for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.42
Host cities have generally viewed the high economic and capital costs
to host the Olympic Games as an opportunity to induce economic
development and gain international recognition. For instance, the
IOC touted the establishment of Australia’s first large-scale urban
water recycling system and the restoration of 160 hectares of “badly
degraded land” in Sydney as long-term benefits from the 2000
Summer Olympic Games.43 Given the increasingly high costs,
however, a number of cities, including Rome and Boston, have
withdrawn applications to host the 2024 Olympic Games, limiting the
availability of host cities for future games.44 The IOC has sought to
curb the increasing costs of the games, making sustainability one of
the three pillars of the Olympic Agenda 2020.45
C.

Past Scandals and Corruption Risk

The selection of the host city is a crucial process for the IOC
because the IOC generates all of its revenue by promoting, licensing
and hosting the Olympic Games. Thus, corruption in the process of
selecting a host city and planning the games is a pernicious risk to the
organization. Scrutiny of corruption related to host-city bidding
began after members of the Salt Lake City Olympic Organizing
Committee were alleged to have paid IOC members to secure the
rights to host the 2002 Winter Games.46 Those allegations arose in
December 1998, after Marc Hodler—a long-serving IOC member
41. Id. at 54, 129.
42. Clay Dillow, Hosting the Olympics is a Terrible Investment, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Aug. 15, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/hosting-the-olympics-is-aterrible-investment/.
43. Int’l Olympic Comm., Sydney Still Reaping Benefits of Hosting Olympic Games
2000 (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.olympic.org/news/sydney-still-reaping-benefits-ofhosting-olympic-games-2000.
44. See Andy Bull, Revised: The Biggest Threat to the Future of the Olympic Games,
GUARDIAN (July 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/jul/27/biggest-threatfuture-olympic-games-rio-2016-ioc-thomas-bach-hosts; Rome to Pull Out of Olympics 2024
Bid on Cost Grounds, SKY NEWS (Sept. 22, 2016), http://news.sky.com/story/rome-set-topull-out-of-olympics-2024-bid-on-cost-grounds-10586903; Hayden Bird, The Life and
Death
of
Boston’s
Olympic
Bid,
BOSTON.COM
(Aug.
4,
2016),
https://www.boston.com/sports/sports-news/2016/08/04/the-life-and-death-of-bostonsolympic-bid.
45. 2015 Annual Report, supra note 7, at 62.
46. See Thomas A. Hamilton, The Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt
Lake City Olympic Games Bribery Scandal, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 219, 221–24 (2010).
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and lawyer in Switzerland—alleged that five to seven percent of the
votes to select host cities were arranged by bribes through agents.47
At roughly the same time, a Salt Lake City newspaper published a
leaked document purporting to show that members of the city’s bid
team created a scholarship fund for relatives of IOC members.48 As a
result of an IOC investigation, ten members were expelled or
resigned and ten members were sanctioned.49 The IOC declined to
sanction members of the Salt Lake Organizing Committee because it
punished the responsible IOC Members.50 However, in July 2000,
U.S. prosecutors indicted the former President and Vice President of
the Organizing Committee for allegedly offering and paying one
million dollars to influence the votes of more than a dozen IOC
members and falsifying the books of the Organizing Committee to
hide the conduct.51 Neither was convicted.52
Further investigation of the Salt Lake City allegations by the
IOC led to the revelation that corruption in the selection and bidding
process was widespread, and potentially had been so for decades. 53
For example, reports stated that an Australian official paid $70,000
for the votes of two African IOC Members, which resulted in the
award of the 2000 Summer Olympic Games to Sydney,54 and Richard
Pound, the Vice President responsible for investigating misconduct
related to the Salt Lake City bid, stated that he previously had been
47. See Stephen Wilson, Olympic Corruption Whistleblower Dies, WASH. POST (Oct.
18,
2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/18/AR2006101800310_pf.html.
48. Id.
49. See Lisa Riley Roche, IOC Members May Still Face Sanctions, DESERET NEWS
(Aug. 24, 2001), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/860292/IOC-member-may-still-facesanctions.html?pg=all. One of the members passed away. See Thomas A. Hamilton, The
Long Hard Fall from Mount Olympus: The 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games Bribery
Scandal, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 219, 224 (2010).
50. See Jere Longman, Olympics; 2 Officials Quit in Salt Lake City As Olympic Scandal
Details
Grow,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
9,
1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/09/sports/olympics-2-officials-quit-in-salt-lake-city-asolympic-scandal-details-grow.html.
51. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Former Officials of Salt Lake City Olympic
Organizing Committee Indicted for Roles in Olympic Site Selection (July 20, 2000),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2000/July/413crm.htm.
52. See Lex Hemphill, Olympics; Acquittals End Bid Scandal that Dogged Winter
Games, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/06/sports/olympicsacquittals-end-bid-scandal-that-dogged-winter-games.html.
53. See Marc Fisher & Bill Brubaker, Privileged World of IOC’s Members Under
Scrutiny, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/digest/daily/jan99/ioc23.htm; Kieran Daley, Olympic Games: IOC Report Shows
“Decades of Bribery”, INDEP. (Jan. 20, 1999), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympicgames-ioc-report-shows-decades-of-bribery-1075358.html.
54. See Fisher & Brubaker, supra note 53.
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offered a one million dollar bribe from a foreign TV network in
exchange for favorable contract terms.55 Reports stated that an
internal investigation of the IOC bidding procedures found that, in
certain circumstances, gifts to IOC members were not reasonable,
ordinary or routine, and included gifts such as medical services,
college scholarships, jobs, airline tickets, hotel accommodations, and
cash.56
II.

IOC ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE PROGRAM

Following reports of corruption related to Salt Lake City’s bid
for the Winter Olympics, the IOC implemented a number of reforms
that altered the composition, structure and organization of the IOC
and addressed some deficiencies in the designation of the host city
for the Olympic Games.57 As to membership, the IOC implemented
an age limit of seventy for members, restricted the total number of
members to 115, and created the Nominations Commission (later the
Members Election Commission) to add transparency to the process of
selecting candidates and electing members.58
The IOC also
implemented a number of recommendations meant to improve
transparency regarding the disbursement of finances, including the
disclosure of all allocations of funds to NOCs and IFs and a
requirement that all candidate cities disclose sources of funding for
bid expenditures for the purpose of conducting audits.59 In addition,
when signing a contract with the host city, the IOC requires that the
host city, host NOC, and OCOG abide by internationally recognized
anti-corruption standards by establishing and maintaining an effective
compliance program.60
55. Steven Pearlstein, Evidence of Corruption “Irrefutable,” IOC Official Says, WASH.
POST (Jan. 21, 1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/digest/daily/jan99/oly21.htm.
56. See A. Craig Copetas & Roger Thurow, Salt Lake Scandal Draft Report is Certain
to
Upset
the
IOC,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
20,
1999),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB916784416903326000.
57. See Richard Sandomir, Olympics; I.O.C. Push for Reform Seeks Rules on Bribery,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/01/sports/olympics-ioc-pushfor-reform-seeks-rules-on-bribery.html; Int’l Olympic Comm., Report by the IOC 2000
Comm’n
to
the
110th
IOC
Session
1
(Dec.
1999),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-WeAre/Commissions/IOC-2000-Reform-Follow-up/EN-110th-IOC-Session-Report-by-theIOC-2000-Commission-December-1999.pdf.
58. See Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 57, at 3–5.
59. See id. at 26.
60. Int’l Olympic Comm., Host City Contract 2024 – Principles, 15.2 (Sept. 2015)
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/Host_City_Contract_Principles.
pdf.
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In 1999, the IOC amended the Olympic Charter to create the
Ethics Commission, which is responsible for conducting
investigations into breaches of ethics and recommending disciplinary
measures or sanctions to the Executive Board.61 The Ethics
Commission is responsible for publishing and updating the IOC Code
of Ethics, which binds the IOC members, NOCs, IFs, and OCOGs to
“act with the highest degree of integrity” and with “impartiality,
objectivity, independence and professionalism.”62 According to the
Code of Ethics, “Olympic parties,” including IOC members, must
not, directly or indirectly, “solicit, accept or offer any form of
remuneration or commission, nor any concealed benefit or service of
any nature, connected with the Olympic Games.”63 The only
exception is that members may take “tokens of consideration or
friendship of nominal value, in accordance with prevailing local
customs.”64
The IOC has continued to modify and supplement its
compliance program over the years. In 2013, the IOC adopted the
Universal Principles of Good Governance, emphasizing transparency,
particularly with regard to the IOC’s finances.65 Notably, the IOC
must now maintain an internal controls system to establish “control
of the financial processes and operations” within the organization,
including a “compliance system, document retention system and
information security system.”66 Moreover, in 2014, the IOC adopted
the Olympic Agenda 2020, which suggested forty recommendations
meant to, among other things, strengthen the IOC commitment to
good governance, transparency and ethics.67 Pursuant to those
61. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Comm’n (last visited Jan. 22, 2017),
https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission; Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter, Rule
22
(effective
Aug.
2,
2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
62. See Int’l
Olympic
Comm., Code
of
Ethics
11,
14
(2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Code-ofEthics/2016/Book-Code-of-Ethics-2016.pdf#_ga=1.47959138.415998738.1485096175.
63. Id at 14.
64. Id.
65. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Good Governance, https://www.olympic.org/goodgovernance (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
66. Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 62, at 69.
67. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Agenda 2020: 20+20 Recommendations
(2014),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Olympic
-Agenda-2020/Olympic-Agenda-2020-20-20Recommendations.pdf#_ga=1.48429027.415998738.1485096175; see also Int’l Olympic
Comm., IOC Annual Report: Credibility, Sustainability and Youth (2015),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/IOC-
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recommendations, the IOC publishes an annual report of its financial
statements and has its financial statements audited in accordance with
the International Financial Reporting Standards.68
Implementation of the Olympic Agenda 2020 began in earnest
in 2015. At that time, the IOC bolstered the independence of the
Ethics Commission by having its members elected by the Session
(rather than appointed by the Executive Board), revised existing
ethics policies, launched an integrity and compliance hotline, and
created the Ethics and Compliance Office to conduct independent
investigations of suspected wrongdoing and provide education,
information, and confidential advice to Olympic personnel regarding
the ethical principles and rules.69 Notably, the IOC revised conflict of
interest rules to require IOC members with a potential conflict of
interest—including the interests of a parent, spouse, relation or
dependent—from “accepting any form of benefit whatsoever” and
directing the IOC member to consult with the Chief Ethics and
Compliance Officer.70
Finally, the IOC implemented a number of changes in the
process by which candidate cities submit bids to host the Olympic
Games.71 Most important, the IOC President now selects an
Evaluation Commission to evaluate bids from candidate cities and to
conduct site visits.72 The Evaluation Commission Working Group
then publishes an open report to the Executive Board summarizing
the contents of the bids and making transparent recommendations
based on a pre-approved matrix.73 IOC members who are not on the
Evaluation Commission are prohibited from visiting candidate cities,
and the candidate cities are prohibited from hosting sporting events at
which large numbers of IOC members would participate.74
During the bidding process, the IOC prohibits an IOC member

Annual-Report/IOC-Annual%20Report-2015.pdf#_ga=1.82040787.415998738.1485096175.
68. See Int’l Olympic Comm. Olympic Agenda 2020: 20+20 Recommendations, at 21
(2014).
69. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Commission (Jan. 22, 2017),
https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission.
70. See Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 62, at 30, 31 (2016).
71. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., Olympic Agenda 2020, supra note 68 at 3, 9–11.
72. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Evaluation Commission (Jan. 22, 2017),
https://www.olympic.org/evaluation-commission.
73. See Int’l Olympic Comm., Games of the XXXII Olympiad 2020 Working Group
Report, (Apr. 5, 2012), https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/Finalreport-2020-Working-Group-English.pdf.
74. Int’l Olympic Comm., supra note 62, at 35, 40.
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from receiving any gift, of any value, from a candidate city. 75
Candidate cities are allowed to promote their bids to IOC members,
but only during international events or competitions or through
written documentation.76 Moreover, promotion cannot be undertaken
by third parties.77 Further, the IOC requires that the candidate city
and associated NOC declare and register all consultants, individuals
or companies that are participating in or supporting the city’s
candidacy to the IOC.78
Most recently, the IOC entered into a contract with Los Angeles
and the U.S. NOC related to the 2028 Summer Olympics that
contains, for the first time, a provision prohibiting fraud or corruption
on the part of the host city, NOC, or Organizing Committee with
respect to their activities organizing the Olympic games, including
“by establishing and maintaining effective reporting and
compliance.”79
The IOC has undoubtedly made many positive changes to its
anti-corruption program in the last fifteen-years in response to the
corruption risks it has confronted. To examine the effectiveness of
these changes – and any gaps that remain in the IOC’s policies and
procedures – it is useful to step back and consider internationally
accepted best practices for anti-corruption compliance programs. We
can then assess the IOC’s program through the prism of those best
practices.
III. ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
There are a number of international standards available setting
forth best practices for corporate anti-bribery and corruption
programs, including guidance published by the OECD and

75. Id. at 41.
76. Id. at 40.
77. Id. at 38.
78. Id. at 36.
79. INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., Host City Contract Principles: Games of the XXXIV
Olympiad – Candidature Process 2028, (July 2017),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/HostCity-Elections/XXXIV-Olympiad-2028/Host-City-Contract-2028Principles.pdf#_ga=2.166505593.696523938.1501602803-1756006933.1453748726; Andy
Spalding, The Olympic Anti-Corruption Era Begins, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 1, 2017), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/8/1/andy-spalding-the-olympic-anti-corruption-erabegins.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+fcpab
log%2FsLbh+%28The+FCPA+Blog%29.
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International Standards Organizations.80 Further, the United States
and United Kingdom have both offered guidance regarding the best
practices for an anti-bribery and corruption compliance program.81
International authorities have tended to converge on the basic
elements of an effective compliance program, such as the one that the
IOC would be advised to continue to build as a result of its past
experiences with corruption in the bidding process. The following
are some of the hallmarks of an effective anti-corruption compliance
program, focusing on those elements that would be most relevant to
the IOC, and using U.S. enforcement authorities as a guidepost.
A.

Commitment from Senior Management

Compliance begins with senior leaders setting a proper tone and
creating a “compliance culture.”82 In assessing the effectiveness of a
compliance program, U.S. enforcement authorities evaluate the extent
to which senior management has “clearly articulated company
standards, communicated them in unambiguous terms, adhered to
them scrupulously, and disseminated them throughout the
organization.”83 Commitment from senior management is necessary
to transform a strong paper compliance program into an effective tool
to fight corruption. Strong commitment from senior management
encourages middle management to reinforce the message, expanding

80. See generally Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and
Compliance, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18, 2010),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44884389.pdf;
ISO
37001:2016
Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use, Int’l Organization for
Standardization (2016), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:37001:ed-1:v1:en.
81. See generally DEP’T OF JUST. & SEC. & EXCH. COMM., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) [hereinafter FCPA Resource Guide]; U.S.
SENT’G COMM., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2012); see also MINISTRY OF
JUST., THE BRIBERY ACT 2010 (2011).
82. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57; see also MINISTRY OF JUST., THE
BRIBERY ACT 2010: Guidance § 2.1 (2010) (calling for “top-level management” to “foster a
culture” in which “bribery is never acceptable”); THE WORLD BANK, SUMMARY OF WORLD
BANK GROUP INTEGRITY COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES § 2.1 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 ANTIBRIBERY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS — REQUIREMENTS WITH GUIDANCE FOR USE § A.3.1, INT’L
ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION (2016); DEPT. OF JUST., THE FRAUD SECTION’S
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE 7 (2016) (stating a
company must have “established culture of compliance, including awareness among
employees that any criminal conduct, including the conduct underlying the investigation,
will not be tolerated”).
83. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57; see also ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.1.2(d)–(e), (h)–(k), Int’l
Organization for Standardization (2016); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010:
Guidance § 2.2 (2010).
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the reach and influence of compliance programs and staff.84
Alternatively, weak leadership (including explicit or implicit
messages to engage in or overlook misconduct to achieve sales or
business objectives) undermines the effectiveness of compliance
programs and may subject a company to criminal liability.85
B.

Code of Conduct

A code of conduct is viewed as a foundational element of an
effective compliance program.86 Effective codes are clear, concise,
and accessible to all employees of the company and any third parties
that do business on the company’s behalf.87 U.S. enforcement
authorities emphasize that the code of conduct should be available in
the local languages of any employees working in foreign countries,
and an organization should periodically reviews its code of conduct
to ensure that it is current and effective.88
U.S. enforcement authorities also evaluate whether a company
has policies and procedures that outline compliance responsibilities in
the company; establish appropriate internal controls, auditing
practices, and documentation policies; and set forth disciplinary
procedures in the event of a violation.89 Specific policies and
procedures should be tailored to take into account a company’s
business model, the size of the business, and risks associated with the
business.90 To be effective, the policies and procedures must be
84. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57.
85. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (setting forth the
“minim[um] require[ments]” for governing authorities and high-level personnel in
“promoti[ng] an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a culture of
compliance with law”); Dept. of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, U.S. Attorney’s Manual §9-28.800 (2015).
86. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57; see also ISO 37001:2016 AntiBribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 4.3, Int’l
Organization for Standardization (2016).
87. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57; see also Ministry of Justice, The
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance, Principle 1 and § 1.1 (2010); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery
Act 2010: Guidance § 2.2 (2010); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and
Compliance § 2, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18, 2010);
ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for
Use §§ 5.2, 8.5, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
88. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 57–58; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.2, 7.4, Int’l
Organization for Standardization (2016).
89. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58; see also Ministry of Justice, The
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 1.6, 1.7 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management
Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.2, 7.2.2.1, 7.5, 8.3, 8.4, A.11, A.12,
Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
90. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58; see also Ministry of Justice, The
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developed based on an “in-depth understanding of the company’s
business model, including its products and services, third-party
agents, customers, government interactions, and industry and
geographic risks.”91
C.

Oversight, Autonomy and Resources of Compliance
Program

It is important for those charged with leading the compliance
effort to have the necessary autonomy and resources to carry out their
duties. Enforcement authorities often evaluate whether a company
has assigned responsibility for the oversight and implementation of
the program to one or more specific senior executives within an
organization92 and whether those individuals have appropriate
authority within the organization, adequate autonomy from
management, and sufficient staffing and resources to ensure that the
compliance program is implemented.93 Adequate autonomy usually
requires that the compliance officer be given direct access to a
company’s governing authority, such as the board or audit
committee.94
The sufficiency of compliance resources is often measured
based on the size, structure, and risk profile of a company (including,
among other things, its complexity, industry, and geographical
reach).95
Enforcement authorities may evaluate other control
functions, such as Legal, Finance, and Audit, against these
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 1.3, 1.7 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management
Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 4.3, Int’l Organization for
Standardization (2016).
91. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58.
92. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 5.3.2, Int’l Organization for
Standardization (2016); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and
Compliance § 4, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18, 2010);
The World Bank, Summary of World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines § 2.3
(2010).
93. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58 (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
§ 8B2.1(2)(B)-(C) (2011)).
94. See id.; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with
Guidance for Use §§ 5.3.2, A.6.2, A.6.3, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016);
Dept. of Justice, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and
Guidance 7 (2016).
95. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58.; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery
Act 2010: Guidance § 3.3 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems —
Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.1.1(c)–(d), 7.1, A.6.1, A.7, Int’l Organization for
Standardization (2016); Dept. of Justice, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Enforcement Plan and Guidance 7 (2016).
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requirements as well.96 Further, enforcement authorities recognize
that the compliance reporting structure may appropriately vary
depending on the size and complexity of the organization.97 For
instance, in larger organizations, it may be necessary to delegate dayto-day operational responsibilities for the compliance program to
other individuals.
Often, companies found to have engaged in corruption create
new or enhanced compliance resources to prevent future misconduct.
For example, in 2008, Siemens entered into a plea agreement with the
U.S. Department of Justice related to serious violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) spanning its global operations.98 In
accepting a plea, the U.S. government noted Siemens’
“extraordinary” reorganization and remediation efforts that “set a
high standard for multi-national companies to follow.”99 Among
other measures, Siemens consolidated its compliance organization
under a new position, the Chief Compliance Officer, who reported
directly to the CEO and General Counsel, a structure that has since
become increasingly common.100 Siemens also required that every
member of its 450-person audit staff reapply for their positions to
ensure that auditing personnel were competent.101
D.

Risk Assessments

Risk assessments are essential to an effective compliance
program: the design of internal controls in a company must take into
account the operational realities and risks of a company’s business.
When evaluating a compliance program, enforcement authorities
consider whether and to what degree a company analyzes and
addresses its particular risks.102 Companies are expected to increase
96. See Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 2–3 (2017);
ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for
Use §§ 8.10(c)–(d), 9.2.4, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
97. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58.
98. See Dep’t. Sentencing Memorandum at 3–10, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 08-cr-00367).
99. See id. at 14, 24
100. Id. at 22.
101. See Dep’t. Sentencing Memorandum at 22, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 08-cr-367).
102. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 40, 58; Dept. of Justice, The Fraud
Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance 7 (2016); Dept. of
Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 4–5 (2017); Ministry of Justice, The
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 3.1, 3.5 (2010); The World Bank, Summary of World Bank
Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines § 3 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 4.5, A.4, Int’l
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their compliance procedures and resources—including in areas such
as due diligence or internal audits—as appropriate to meet the types
and level of risks they face.103
It is important to tailor a compliance program. One-size-fits-all
compliance programs are not effective and, often, limited compliance
resources are wasted on low-risk markets and transactions, while
insufficient resources are dedicated to higher-risk areas. The U.S.
Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission
give “meaningful credit” to risk-based programs that fail to prevent
an infraction in a low-risk area because resources were directed to
higher-risk transactions.104
Alternatively, companies are more
culpable where a violation occurs because a company failed to
“perform a level of due diligence commensurate with the size and
risk of the transaction.”105
E.

Training and Continuing Advice

Effective compliance programs must be communicated
throughout an organization, including risk-based periodic training
and certification for all directors, officers, “relevant” employees, and,
when appropriate, agents and business partners.106 Trainings should
cover compliance policies and procedures, instruction on applicable
law, practical advice, and case studies.107 The content also should be
tailored for the intended audience, and U.S. enforcement authorities
suggest providing training in local languages and adjusting the
training content to address the different risks that personnel are likely
to encounter.108 Depending on their size, companies should also
Organization for Standardization (2016).
103. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act
2010: Guidance § 4.5 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems —
Requirements with Guidance for Use § 8.2, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
104. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59.
105. Id.
106. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs 4–5 (2017) (asking, among other things, whether “there
has been clear guidance and/or training for the key gatekeepers . . . in control processes
relevant to the potential misconduct”); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance
§§ 1.7, 5.1, 5.6–5.8 (2010); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and
Compliance §§ 8, 11(i), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18,
2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance
for Use § 7.3, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
107. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery
Act 2010: Guidance § 5.5 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems —
Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 7.3, 8.9, Int’l Organization for Standardization
(2016).
108. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
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implement “appropriate measures” to provide guidance and advice on
complying with the company’s compliance program, including when
such advice is urgent.109
F.

Incentives and Disciplinary Measures

Enforcement authorities underline the importance of enforcing
compliance requirements in an organization and incentivizing
compliant behavior, specifically, whether a company has appropriate
and clear disciplinary policies that apply equally to all employees;
whether the procedures are applied fairly, consistently, and promptly,
including against managers who supervise employees who violate
company policy; and whether the punishments are commensurate
with the violation.110
Compliance programs also should create positive incentives for
ethical behavior, while taking care to ensure that rewards do not
create unintended negative consequences.111 U.S. enforcement
authorities encourage companies to highlight compliance within their
organizations and to consider ethics and compliance in promotion,
compensation, and evaluation decisions.112
G.

Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments

Agents, consultants, distributors, and other third parties are
commonly used as conduits for improper payments. Under the
FCPA, for example, knowledge includes more than actual knowledge
of wrongdoing: a person has knowledge if he or she consciously
avoids actual knowledge.113 U.S. enforcement authorities believe that
knowledge includes willful blindness to any “‘signaling device’ that
should reasonably alert [a company] of the ‘high probability’ of an
Corporate Compliance Programs 5 (2017).
109. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 8.9, A.2.2.3, Int’l
Organization for Standardization (2016) (providing potential guidance when personnel face
improper requests).
110. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs 6 (2017); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls,
Ethics, and Compliance § 10, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(Feb.18, 2010).
111. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59–60; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs 6 (2017); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls,
Ethics, and Compliance § 9, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(Feb.18, 2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with
Guidance for Use §§ 7.2.2.2, A.8.2, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
112. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 59-60.
113. See United States v. Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2011).
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FCPA violation.”114 As a result of this heightened “knowledge”
standard under the FCPA, risk-based third-party due diligence is
considered an essential hallmark of an effective anti-corruption
compliance program, and companies are expected to respond to any
red flags that arise, whether as part of pre-engagement due diligence
or throughout the relationship.115
While U.S. enforcement authorities recognize that due diligence
should take into account the industry, country, length of relationship
with the third party, and the size and nature of the transaction, they
also define three general avenues of inquiry that “always apply.”116
First, companies must understand the qualifications and associations
of the third party, including its business reputation and
relationships.117 The degree of scrutiny should increase if a company
becomes aware of red flags.118
Second, companies must understand the business rationale for
incorporating third parties into a transaction.119 Companies should
compare the payment terms for the third party to typical terms in the
industry and country, check the timing and source of the third party’s
introduction to the transaction, and confirm and document that the
third party is actually performing work and that the pay is
commensurate with the work.120

114. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 22 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at
922).
115. See id. at 23; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 7
(2017); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 4.3–4.5 (2010); ISO
37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§
8.2, A.10, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016); The World Bank, Summary of
World Bank Group Integrity Compliance Guidelines § 5.1 (2010); Good Practice Guidance
on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance § 6(i), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (Feb.18, 2010). The SEC and DOJ provide a non-exhaustive list
of examples of common “red flags” in third-party transactions: (1) excessive commissions to
agents or consultants; (2) unreasonably large discounts to distributors; (3) “consulting
agreements” with vaguely defined services; (4) third parties unqualified for the work in
which they have been engaged; (5) third parties with close relationships to foreign officials;
(6) third-parties that enter the transaction at the request of a foreign official; (7) shell
companies operating as third-parties; and (8) third-party requests to use offshore bank
accounts. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 22–23.
116. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60.
117. Id.; see also Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance § 4.5 (2010); ISO
37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §§
A.10.3(a)(2), A.12(a), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
118. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60.
119. Id.; see also ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements
with Guidance for Use §§ A.10.3(a), A.12(b), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
120. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
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Third, companies should conduct ongoing monitoring of third
parties.121 Depending on the level of risk, companies should update
due diligence periodically, exercise audit rights, and provide periodic
training to third parties.122 Third parties should be made aware of the
company’s anti-corruption policies, and may submit annual
compliance certifications assuring the company of a reciprocal
commitment to ethical and lawful business practices.123
H.

Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigations

An effective compliance program provides a secure, confidential
and accessible means for employees to report suspected or actual
violations of the company’s policies, provide suggestions for
improvement of a company’s anti-corruption procedures, and request
advice.124 The compliance function should have complete access to
all reporting and investigative information,125 and, in all cases,
employees should be able to use the systems without fear of
retaliation.126
Companies must also create an efficient, reliable and properly
funded process to undertake reasonably scoped investigations of
Corporate Compliance Programs 7 (2017) (asking about the “business rationale for the use
of the third parties” and how the company ensured “that the payment terms are appropriate,
that the described contractual work is performed, and that compensation is commensurate
with the services rendered”).
121. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60; see also ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 8.2, Int’l Organization for
Standardization (2016).
122. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 60.
123. Id. at 60–61; see also Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance § 5.7
(2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with
Guidance for Use §§ 7.3, A.10(e), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
124. FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 61; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act
2010: Guidance § 5.3 (2010); Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and
Compliance § 11.1(ii), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Feb.18,
2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance
for Use § 8.9(a)–(c), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
125. See Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 5 (2017); ISO
37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use §
A.18.2, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
126. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 61; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery
Act 2010: Guidance §§ 2.3, 5.3 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems
— Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ 5.2.1(1), 7.2.2.1(d), 8.9(d), Int’l Organization for
Standardization (2016). The International Standards Organization suggests that antiretaliation provisions be extended to cover an employee’s refusal, in good faith or on a
reasonable basis, to engage in an activity where there is more than a low risk of bribery that
has not been adequately mitigated by the company, even if the refusal results in a loss of
business. See ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with
Guidance for Use §§ 5.2.1(l), 7.2.2.1(d), Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
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allegations of misconduct and documenting the response, including
disciplinary or remedial measures.127
Enforcement authorities
emphasize that companies should use internal investigations as an
opportunity to learn from experience and update the company’s
compliance program as appropriate.128
I.

Continuous Improvement and Periodic Testing and Review

Enforcement authorities emphasize the importance of
continuously reviewing and improving a compliance program to
address weaknesses or risks exposed through periodic risk
assessments, testing, audits, investigations, and changes in a
company’s area of operation, the nature of the customers, applicable
laws, and industry standards.129
Companies committed to improvement make “thoughtful efforts
to create a sustainable compliance program if a problem is later
discovered,” and address risk areas before they become violations.130
Companies can use employee surveys, risk assessments, control
testing, and internal audits to identify new risks or weaknesses in
internal controls, although the nature and frequency of evaluations
can appropriately vary depending on the size, complexity and risk
127. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 61; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of
Corporate Compliance Programs 5 (2017); Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010:
Guidance § 6.2 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems —
Requirements with Guidance for Use §§ A.18.1, A.18.3, Int’l Organization for
Standardization (2016). The International Standards Organization recommends that
companies focus during investigations on, among other things, applicable local law, the risk
of defamation, the protection of individuals making reports, potential criminal and civil
liability, and any legal obligations or benefits related to reporting investigations to
authorities. See ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management Systems — Requirements with
Guidance for Use § A.18.6, Int’l Organization for Standardization (2016).
128. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 61; Good Practice Guidance on
Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance § 11(iii), Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (Feb.18, 2010); Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance
Programs 5 (2017) (suggesting that companies are expected to undertake a root cause
analysis for substantiated instances of misconduct); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery
Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § A.18.8, Int’l Organization
for Standardization (2016) (recommending that companies implement follow-up procedures
for anti-bribery investigations, including appropriate disciplinary action; repaying or
reclaiming any improper benefit obtained as a result of misconduct; terminating,
withdrawing from or modifying the organization’s involvement in a project, transaction or
contract; reporting a matter to the authorities; or, if bribery has occurred, taking action to
avoid or deal with possible consequent legal offenses).
129. See FCPA Resource Guide, supra note 81, at 58–62; Ministry of Justice, The
Bribery Act 2010: Guidance §§ 6.1–6.4 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 Anti-Bribery Management
Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 10.1, Int’l Organization for
Standardization (2016).
130. FCPA Resource Guide supra note 81, at 62.
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profile of the organization.131
IV. GAPS AND CONTINUED AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE IOC’S
PROGRAM
Despite the improvements to its compliance program, the IOC is
still quite vulnerable to the risks of corruption. Indeed, recent
allegations of corruption in the IOC have once again called into
question the organization’s commitment to ethics and integrity.132
For example, French authorities announced an investigation of the
awards for the 2016 and 2020 Summer Olympic Games due to
allegations that the Japanese Olympic Committee used a consultant to
provide up to two million dollars to Lamine Diack, the former
President of the International Association of Athletics Federation, in
exchange for votes.133
Reviewing the IOC’s compliance program in light of
international best practices, there are still gaps in the IOC’s policies
that may provide opportunities for misconduct. This Article now
examines the gaps in the IOC’s program and the areas in which there
is room for improvement.
A.

Membership Selection

The IOC acts through its members – at the annual Session – and
thus, the selection of members is significant to the operation of the
organization. There are both substantive and procedural issues that
can be improved with respect to member selection – with the goals of
improving quality and increasing transparency.

131. See id.; Dept. of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs 6 (2017);
Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance § 6.2 (2010); ISO 37001:2016 AntiBribery Management Systems — Requirements with Guidance for Use § 9.3.1, Int’l
Organization for Standardization (2016) (setting forth areas for top management to examine
to evaluate the effectiveness of a company’s compliance program).
132. See, e.g., Sean Ingle, Tokyo Olympic Games corruption claims bring scandal back
to
the
IOC,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
11,
2016,
10:58
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/may/11/tokyo-olympic-games-2020-iocinternational-olympic-committee-corruption-bid-scandal.
133. See Gerard Bon, France Extends Corruption Probe to Olympic Bids Process,
REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2016, 5:22 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-athletics-corruptionolympics-idUSKCN0W356P; Justin McCurry & Owen Gibson, Tokyo Olympics: Japan to
“Fully Cooperate” with Suspicious Payments Inquiry, THE GUARDIAN (May 16, 2016, 7:48
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/16/tokyo-olympics-japan-vows-tofully-cooperate-with-suspicious-payments-inquiry.
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At the moment, there are no term limits for IOC members.134
And although IOC members cannot serve past age seventy, the age
restriction can be waived by the Session upon the recommendation of
the Executive Board.135 The Olympic Agenda 2020 noted the wide
latitude granted the Session to waive the age limit and recommended
that the exception be applied in a maximum of five cases at a given
time.136 The IOC already adopted the recommendation regarding
waiver of the age limit,137 which is a step in the right direction. The
IOC should also implement term limits for its members. Corporate
governance best practices include term limits for board members to
avoid apathy, to facilitate the removal of non-performing or poor
performing members, and to bring in fresh talent and ideas to a board.
The Olympic Agenda 2020 also recommended that the thenNominations Commission take a more active role in identifying
candidates to ensure that the Session contains an adequate balance in
terms of skill, knowledge and geography.138 The Member Evaluation
Commission was charged with proposing a new targeted recruitment
process for IOC members.139 Currently, the members are essentially
self-selected by the IOC Elections Commission; candidates submit a
CV, a “motivation letter,” and must be sponsored by three IOC
members.140 It is not a particularly transparent or representative
process. The IOC should consider greater transparency in the
nominations as well in the qualifications sought for its members.
B.

Additional Due Diligence and Vetting

In addition to membership selection requirements, the IOC
134. See Int’l Olympic Comm., IOC Members Election Commission,
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-members-election-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
135. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 16.1, 16.3 at 37 (effective Aug. 2,
2016), https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
136. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Agenda 2020: 20+20 Recommendations (2014),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Olympic
-Agenda-2020/Olympic-Agenda-2020-20-20Recommendations.pdf#_ga=1.48429027.415998738.1485096175.
137. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter Rule 16.1 at 37 (effective Aug. 2, 2016),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/ENOlympic-Charter.pdf#_ga=1.48953187.415998738.1485096175.
138. Int’l Olympic Comm., Olympic Agenda 2020: 20+20 Recommendations (2014),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Olympic
-Agenda-2020/Olympic-Agenda-2020-20-20Recommendations.pdf#_ga=1.48429027.415998738.1485096175.
139. Int’l
Olympic
Comm.,
IOC
Members
Election
Commission,
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-members-election-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
140. Id.
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should consider additional requirements and due diligence
surrounding the character and fitness of IOC members. For example,
the IOC can use the Ethics Commission to conduct additional due
diligence and vetting. As officials in a position of public trust, IOC
members should not be subject to convictions or findings suggesting
failures in their ethics and integrity. Further, the IOC should consider
temporary suspensions for members subject to investigations calling
a member’s character or fitness into question; allowing those
members to cast votes for the selection of the host city can cast doubt
on the propriety of the process, especially if the investigations
eventually lead to sanctions. For instance, the list of current, former,
and honorary IOC members still includes individuals involved in the
FIFA scandal, prompting many to suggest that the French
investigation into the selection of the 2016 and 2020 Olympic Games
may be well-founded.141
C.

Internal Controls

The IOC should consider additional policies and procedures to
increase transparency and tighten internal controls. For example, the
IOC should set limits on expenditures and travel, and designate
individuals who are required to approve such expenses depending on
various thresholds. In addition, the IOC should take a close look at
potential conflicts of interest which are likely to arise in the context
of selecting host cities. The IOC should consider requiring disclosure
of potential conflicts to the Ethics Commission and certifications of
assets and income updated annually or as needed.
D.

Training

Another area for increased investment may be additional
training for IOC members. Although the Ethics and Compliance
Office has educational duties, little information exists on formal
training requirements for IOC members regarding their ethical and
professional responsibilities.142 At a minimum, IOC members should
141. See Sean Ingle, Tokyo Olympic Games Corruption Claims Bring Scandal Back to
IOC,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
11,
2016,
10:58
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/may/11/tokyo-olympic-games-2020-iocinternational-olympic-committee-corruption-bid-scandal (citing Lamine Diack, mentioned
above as the potential recipient of two million dollars from the Japanese NOC in exchange
for votes; Sepp Blatter, the former, disgraced president of FIFA; Issa Hayatou, accused of
taking $1.5 million to support Qatar’s bid for the World Cup; and Sheikh Ahmad al-Fahad
al-Sabah, accused of using the Olympic Council of Asia to buy votes).
142. Int’l
Olympic
Comm.,
Ethics
Commission:
Decisions,
https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
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annually certify that they have read the Code of Ethics. In addition,
the IOC should consider implementing a periodic training program
regarding ethics that includes specific situations that IOC members
may encounter. The training should be tailored to the situations that
IOC members actually face when interacting with candidate cities,
vendors, or sponsors.
E.

Gifts

Since IOC members are permitted to receive “gifts of nominal
value” when culturally appropriate,143 the IOC should consider a
policy requiring members to document such gifts because it would
provide information regarding the cultures and geographies where
gift giving is expected with respect to members’ IOC responsibilities.
Similarly, IOC members should be required to disclose improper
solicitations or offers of gifts to the Ethics and Compliance Office.
F.

Enforcement and Initiation of Investigations

Even with new procedures, there has been a lack of robust
enforcement at the IOC. In the last three years, there have been only
two final decisions of the Ethics Commission: one reinstating a
previously suspended member and another suspending a member for
plagiarism.144 There has been no enforcement for misconduct in any
other areas during this period.145 The last findings related to
corruption were in 2011, in which the IOC issued a reprimand to Issa
Hayatou—who remains a member—and a warning to Lamine Diack
for accepting payments from a marketing partner of FIFA as
President of the African Football Confederation.146 Stricter discipline
against those individuals may have protected the IOC from recent
allegations. As noted above, Mr. Diack is the target of a French
investigation of alleged payments made by the Japanese NOC in
143. Int’l Olympic Comm., 2022 Candidature Procedure and Questionnaire,
https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Host_city_elections/FINAL_2022_Candidature_Pro
cedure_and_Questionnaire-FINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
144. Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Commission: Decisions, supra note 130.
145. Id.
146. Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics Commission Decision with Recommendation
N°D/02/2011
(Oct.
3,
2011),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-WeAre/Commissions/Ethics/Decisions/EN-Decision-N-02-11-dated-03-102011.pdf#_ga=1.2175093.415998738.1485096175; Int’l Olympic Comm., Ethics
Commission Decision with Recommendation N°D/01/2011 (Oct. 3, 2011),
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-WeAre/Commissions/Ethics/Decisions/EN-Decision-N-01-11-dated-03-102011.pdf#_ga=1.178698340.1118399489.1487368123.
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exchange for votes, and Mr. Hayatou is the subject of allegations
related to the FIFA corruption scandal.147
Enforcement authorities may view the failure to implement
discipline consistently as a fatal deficiency in an otherwise effective
compliance program. A lack of discipline can be perceived as the
product of a weak commitment to ethical issues from senior
leadership, structural problems with reporting within the
organization, or the result of under-developed compliance
investigation and audit resources.
In order to have more robust enforcement, the IOC should
consider broadening the manner in which investigations may be
initiated. Under the current system, only the IOC President or the
Ethics Commission can initiate proceedings.148
It is worth
considering the creation of a separate audit or investigative office that
is independent of both the Ethics Commission and the Ethics and
Compliance Office and that can commence investigations on its own.
This would also increase the IOC’s internal investigations capacity to
ensure that matters were handled by experienced investigators.
Relatedly, the IOC’s external audit is currently limited to finances; 149
it should consider an external audit for compliance controls.
Although the IOC has an ethics hotline, the pace of enforcement
suggests that it has not been an effective tool for identifying potential
misconduct.150 This may be because the hotline may not have been
adequately publicized or there may also be some concern in using it.
The IOC should create a separate confidentiality and non-retaliation
policy to encourage use of the ethics hotline and consultation with the
Ethics and Compliance Office.
G.

Risk Assessments

The Ethics and Compliance Office – or a separate audit or
investigative office – should be equipped to conduct regular risk
assessments to ensure that the compliance program is effective. This
can be particularly significant and necessary when there are bids from

147. Id.
148. Int’l
Olympic
Comm.,
IOC
Members
Election
Commission,
https://www.olympic.org/ioc-members-election-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
149. Int’l Olympic Comm., Audit Committee, https://www.olympic.org/audit-committee
(last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
150. See
Int’l
Olympic
Comm.,
Ethics
Commission:
Decisions,
https://www.olympic.org/ethics-commission (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
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countries that have a high perception of corruption.151 It is
insufficient to develop a compliance program and allow it to become
stale; it must be tested and verified to help the organization mitigate
corruption risks.
H.

Use of Independent Monitors

Another factor to consider is the use of independent monitors.
While monitors have often been required by U.S. enforcement
authorities as part of an agreement to settle corruption charges, some
entities, and even governments, have used monitors in a proactive
manner. For example, South Korea has implemented government
monitoring to oversee spending related to the 2018 Olympic
Games.152 The appointment of a credible and independent monitor to
assist with specific issues or projects is an idea worth considering.
While some may be deterred by the investment of resources at the
front end, an effective monitor could not only assist in preventing
corruption, but could be a helpful tool in reducing costs overall.
Moreover, a monitor can be helpful in protecting against reputational
risks.
CONCLUSION
The failure to award the Olympic Games to a viable host city is
potentially an existential threat to the IOC. Such a result would run
counter to the IOC’s fundamental mission of protecting and
promoting the Olympic Games, and it would impair revenues through
an entire Olympiad. The IOC has made considerable progress
updating its organization and installing a compliance program, and
the organization should be commended for the actions taken in the
wake of the Salt Lake City bribery scandal and, more recently, as a
result of the Olympic Agenda 2020. Despite those gains, the IOC
should stay vigilant for additional opportunities to close potential
gaps and strengthen its ethics and compliance program. The IOC’s
resolve to stamp out corruption should be grounded in both its moral
commitment to good governance and fair competition and the sheer
economic importance of managing the Olympic Games responsibly
and free of corruption. With some changes to its anti-corruption
151. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 (last visited
Jan. 22, 2017).
152. See Laura Tulchin, To Clean Up Big-Time Sports Events, Start With Monitors,
FCPA BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017, 9:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/2/1/lauratulchin-to-clean-up-big-time-sports-events-start-with.html#sthash.rMOH5pKQ.dpuf.
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program, the IOC could more successfully accomplish that mission.

